--- title: "Before Brazil's run-off: what is documented about influence online" description: "What Brazil's electoral court, its intelligence agency, election observers and fact-checkers have documented about online influence in the 2026 campaign, and what they have not." url: https://attentionmachine.org/en/blog/brazil-runoff-what-is-documented/ lang: en updated: 2026-10-17 license: "CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/)" --- # Before Brazil's run-off: what is documented about influence online 10 October 2026 Brazil chooses its president in a run-off on 25 October[^src-organization-american-2026]. Around the first round, on 4 October, much was said about who might be shaping the campaign online. This post sets out what has been documented, by whom and how, and what has not, so that you can weigh the next claim you meet yourself. We have kept to official records and to research or fact-checking that publishes its method. We name no candidate and no party in what follows; the titles of some of the sources do. The evidence below concerns practices, and several of them were aimed at both of the leading candidates. Quotations from Portuguese sources are our translation. ## The rules The rules on electoral propaganda[^src-tribunal-superior-2019] of Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE), amended for 2026 by Resolution 23.755 of 2 March 2026[^src-tribunal-superior-2026], do four things that matter here: - They ban deepfakes, audio or video “generated or manipulated digitally” to create, replace or alter a person’s image or voice, used to harm or favour a candidacy. - Campaign material made with AI must say so, “explicitly, prominently and accessibly”, and name the technology used. - New for 2026: no publishing, republishing or paid boosting of new AI-made content using the image, voice or words of a candidate or public figure from 72 hours before the end of voting until 24 hours after it, even when labelled. - Also new: AI systems offered by platforms may not “rank, recommend, suggest or prioritise” candidates, even when asked. Not everyone agrees with the court’s controls on disinformation. Observers from the Organization of American States (OAS)[^src-organization-american-2026] recorded that some political groups told them disinformation and hateful posts circulated despite them, while others argued that they “limited freedom of expression and constituted a form of censorship”. ## What the intelligence agency says, and does not The public report of ABIN, Brazil’s intelligence agency, _Desafios de Inteligência – Edição 2026_[^src-abin-2026], published in December 2025, calls the possibility of foreign interference in the election a “risk factor that cannot be underestimated”. It lists the means such interference “can” use: sophisticated disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks on electoral infrastructure, and hidden funding of political groups. It names no country. It is a risk assessment, not a finding. The same chapter describes the platforms’ algorithms as “designed to maximise engagement”. ## What has not been found On the day of the first round, the TSE’s president told journalists[^src-agencia-camara-2026]: “So far, we have no concrete indication of international interference.” The court’s own account[^src-tribunal-superior-2026-b] of his closing statement that night reads: “No facts were found that indicated foreign interference in the Brazilian electoral process.” The OAS observers quoted that sentence in their preliminary report of 6 October[^src-organization-american-2026]. So, as of 9 October, no Brazilian authority has documented a foreign influence operation through social media against this election. A claim that one exists goes further than the record; so does a claim that the question is closed for good. ## What has been documented **Paid posts with an unknown payer.** The fact-checking outlet Aos Fatos[^src-tai-nalon-2026] found that at least 11 foreign accounts published posts promoting one presidential candidate on X between 18 and 21 September, carrying X’s own “paid partnership” label. Its report of 25 September states that who paid for them “remains unknown”. Another candidate asked the TSE on 23 September[^src-caio-junqueira-2026] to have the posts removed; we found no ruling as of 9 October. **AI content in volume, aimed at both leading candidates.** The VigIA project of the fact-checker Lupa[^src-agencia-lupa-2026], which uses detection tools from the University of Campinas, collected 1,941 suspect political posts between 16 August and 28 September. Of the 972 it analysed, 920 were confirmed as made or altered with AI. Of those, 554 were deepfakes, and only 371 carried any AI label. The two candidates now in the run-off were the most often depicted, in posts promoting them and posts attacking them. In the window around the first round when new AI content of candidates was banned, 1 to 5 October, Lupa[^src-beatriz-farrugia-2026] still counted 64 such posts, 37 of them deepfakes. These are counts, not reach. Agência Brasil[^src-felipe-pontes-2026] reported the TSE’s president as saying on 4 October that the feared spread of deepfakes had not materialised, with no incidents of significant repercussion. Both can be true. **Ads during the ad ban, including ads posing as the court’s.** Paid electoral ads are banned online from 48 hours before voting until 24 hours after[^src-tribunal-superior-2019]. NetLab[^src-ufrj-2026], a research laboratory at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, searched the platforms’ ad libraries during that window and found 568 irregular ads on Meta’s platforms. Six more imitated the TSE and offered a non-existent way to vote by phone or from home; some led to sites asking for the visitor’s CPF, the Brazilian taxpayer number. Meta replied that the sample “does not reflect the scale” of its integrity work. ## Checking and reporting - **Siade** is the TSE’s anonymous channel for false content about voting machines, the voting process, or pages and profiles that imitate the electoral courts. The TSE explains how to use it[^src-tribunal-superior-2026-c]. - **Pardal** is the TSE’s app[^src-tribunal-superior-2026-c] for irregular campaigning, including unidentified propaganda online and misleading videos of candidates. It asks you to sign in with e-Título or gov.br. - **Fact-checkers** that publish their methods: Aos Fatos, Lupa, and Comprova[^src-fact-checkers-election], a project of newsrooms led by Abraji, the Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism. A claim that cannot be traced to a document is worth holding loosely, whichever candidate it helps. The wider pattern, and what is known from other countries, is on [Elections & Democratic Harm](https://attentionmachine.org/en/symptoms/elections/). We will re-read these sources after the run-off, and correct this post if any of them changes. ## Sources [^src-tribunal-superior-2019]: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, [_Resolução nº 23.610, de 18 de dezembro de 2019_](https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2019/resolucao-no-23-610-de-18-de-dezembro-de-2019), compiled text: art. 9º-B (labelling of AI content; § 3º-A, the 72-hour and 24-hour window), art. 9º-C § 1º (deepfakes), art. 28 § 1º-C (AI systems may not rank or recommend candidates), art. 29 § 11 (no paid or boosted electoral propaganda online from 48 hours before to 24 hours after the election). [^src-tribunal-superior-2026]: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, [_Resolução nº 23.755, de 2 de março de 2026_](https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-755-de-2-de-marco-de-2026), which amends Resolution 23.610 for the 2026 elections. [^src-abin-2026]: Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN), [_Desafios de Inteligência – Edição 2026_](https://www.gov.br/abin/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/defeso/sem-logo-de-gov_abin_desafios_2026.pdf), December 2025, chapter "Segurança do processo eleitoral de 2026", pp. 68–70. [^src-agencia-camara-2026]: Agência Câmara, [_Presidente do TSE diz não ter sinais de interferência estrangeira e registra substituição de 1.121 urnas_](https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/1308707-presidente-do-tse-diz-nao-ter-sinais-de-interferencia-estrangeira-e-registra-substituicao-de-1-121-urnas), 4 October 2026. [^src-tribunal-superior-2026-b]: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, [_Presidente do TSE conclui 1º turno das Eleições 2026 e projeta mesma tranquilidade para segunda fase do pleito_](https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Outubro/presidente-do-tse-conclui-1o-turno-das-eleicoes-2026-e-projeta-mesma-tranquilidade-para-segunda-fase-do-pleito), 4 October 2026: the "no facts were found" statement. [^src-felipe-pontes-2026]: Felipe Pontes, [_Eleição segue normal e sem sinal de interferência externa, diz Marques_](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-10/eleicao-segue-normal-e-sem-sinal-de-interferencia-externa-diz-marques), Agência Brasil, 4 October 2026: the statement on deepfakes, in indirect speech. [^src-organization-american-2026]: Organization of American States, [_Preliminary Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission in Brazil_](https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/2026_EOM_Brazil_General_Elections_First_Report_ENG.pdf), 6 October 2026; the OAS also published it in Portuguese. [^src-tai-nalon-2026]: Tai Nalon, [_Posts pró-Flávio no X expõem elo entre Polymarket e rede transnacional de desinformação_](https://www.aosfatos.org/noticias/posts-pro-flavio-elo-polymarket-rede-transnacional-desinformacao/), Aos Fatos, 25 September 2026. [^src-caio-junqueira-2026]: Caio Junqueira, [_Renan aponta ao TSE interferência estrangeira na eleição em favor de Flávio_](https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/blogs/caio-junqueira/eleicoes/renan-aponta-ao-tse-interferencia-estrangeira-na-eleicao-em-favor-de-flavio/), CNN Brasil, 23 September 2026: the request to the TSE. [^src-agencia-lupa-2026]: Agência Lupa, Projeto VigIA, [_1º turno teve quase mil conteúdos com IA para promover ou atacar candidatos_](https://uploads.agencialupa.org/2026/10/VigIA-Parcial-1-Turno.pdf), partial report no. 2, 1 October 2026; [the project's method](https://www.agencialupa.org/observatorio/2026/08/11/como-o-vigia-monitora-conteudos-gerados-por-inteligencia-artificial-nas-eleicoes-de-2026/). [^src-beatriz-farrugia-2026]: Beatriz Farrugia, [_Conteúdos com IA circulam em período proibido pela lei eleitoral_](https://www.agencialupa.org/jornalismo/2026/10/07/conteudos-com-ia-circulam-em-periodo-proibido-pela-lei-eleitoral/), Agência Lupa, 7 October 2026. [^src-ufrj-2026]: NetLab UFRJ, [_Observatório das Big Techs: boletins do 1º turno, Eleições 2026_](https://netlab.eco.ufrj.br/post/observatório-das-big-techs-boletins-do-1º-turno-eleições-2026), October 2026; the figures as reported by Rafael Cardoso, [_Big techs descumprem regras eleitorais no dia da votação, diz estudo_](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2026-10/big-techs-descumprem-regras-eleitorais-no-dia-da-votacao-diz-estudo), Agência Brasil, 6 October 2026, with Meta's reply. [^src-tribunal-superior-2026-c]: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, [_Encontrou desinformação sobre as eleições? Saiba como denunciar ao TSE_](https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Setembro/encontrou-desinformacao-sobre-as-eleicoes-saiba-como-denunciar-ao-tse), 18 September 2026 (Siade, and when to use Pardal instead); [_Pardal – Eleições 2026_](https://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/pardal-eleicoes-2026). [^src-fact-checkers-election]: The fact-checkers' election pages: [Aos Fatos](https://www.aosfatos.org/noticias/?canal=eleicoes-2026), [Lupa](https://www.agencialupa.org/eleicoes/), [Comprova](https://projetocomprova.com.br/) ([method](https://projetocomprova.com.br/about/metodologia/)). [← All posts](https://attentionmachine.org/en/blog/)\ [About this project →](https://attentionmachine.org/en/about/) --- Some content on this site was created with the assistance of AI tools and may contain errors. [How we use AI →](https://attentionmachine.org/en/about/how-we-use-ai/)